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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARK KING 
Applicant/Petitioner 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah; 
SUPERIOR ROOFING COMPANY, INC. 
and, 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter under Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 (2), 35-1-86 and 63-46b-16. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether the Petitioner is entitled to additional compensation 
for temporary total disability because of his incarceration after 
his accident which delayed necessary surgical treatment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Intermediate standard of reasonableness and rationality with 
appropriate deference to the decision of the administrative agency 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §63-46b-16 (4). Pro Benefit Staffing, 
Inc. v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Grace 
Drilling v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. of App. 1989). 
* 
* Priority No. 7 
* Case No. 920464-CA 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUES 
The applicable versions of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65: 
35-1-65 Temporary disability (1) In case of temporary 
disability, the employee shall receive sixty-six and two-
thirds percent of that employees1 weekly wages at the 
time of injury so long as such disability is total, but 
not more than a maximum of 100 percent of the State 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week, 
and not less than a minimum of $45.00 per week plus $5.00 
for a dependant spouse and $5.00 for each dependant child 
under the age of the eighteen years, up to a maximum of 
four such dependant children, not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, 
but not to exceed 100 percent of the State average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This case involves a Petition for 
Review of an Industrial Commission Order affirming the 
Administrative Law Judge's denial of a claim for protracted 
temporary total disability benefits because of the Petitioner's 
incarceration. 
B. Course of proceedings below. Petitioner suffered an on-
the-job injury to his wrist for which he has been fully compensated 
under the Workers1 Compensation Act except for the period of time 
between his incarceration at the Utah State Prison on May 22, 1990 
and his surgery on January 30, 1991. The applicant was scheduled 
for surgery prior to his incarceration. The surgery was postponed 
because of his incarceration. Following his release from prison, 
the surgery was rescheduled and temporary total disability benefits 
were paid following surgery during the period of recovery. 
Petitioner sought additional temporary total disability 
compensation from May 22, 1990 to January 29, 1991. 
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The Administrative Law Judge denied the Applicant's claim for 
the additional period of time and the Order was affirmed by the 
Industrial Commission on June 24, 1992. (R. 57). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Petitioner suffered an on-the-job injury to his wrist on 
or about November 20, 1989. (R. 3, 11). 
2. The Petitioner received temporary total disability 
benefits from the Workers Compensation Fund from November 21, 1989 
through May 22, 1990, and again from January 29, 1991 through July 
14, 1991 in the sum of $7,963.68 at which time Petitioner returned 
to work. (R. 3, 11, 12). 
3. The Petitioner was scheduled for surgery on May 30, 1990 
but was not performed because Petitioner was incarcerated on May 
22, 1990 for a parole violation. (R. 11). 
4. The Petitioner was released from prison on October 13, 
1990, and surgery was eventually performed on January 30, 1991. 
(R. 11). 
5. Petitioner claims additional temporary total disability 
compensation during the period of his incarceration from May 22, 
1990 through October 13, 1990, and for the period from October 14, 
1990 until his surgery on January 30, 1991. (R. 43). 
6. Petitioner's claim for additional temporary total 
disability benefits was denied by the Administrative Law Judge. 
The Order of Denial was affirmed by the Commission sitting en banc 
from which Order this appeal was taken. (R. 12, 13, 57)• 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
An injured worker is not entitled to protracted temporary 
total disability benefits when surgery is delayed due to 
circumstances over which the insurance carrier has no control. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
An injured worker cannot unilaterally extend a 
period of temporary total disability for non-
medical reasons unrelated to the industrial 
accident and over which the insurance carrier 
has no control. 
The determination of temporary total disability is a medical 
determination. Stabilization is strictly a medical question that 
is appropriately decided on the basis of medical evidence. Booms 
v. Rapp Construction Companyf 720 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986). 
If the applicant had undergone surgery on May 30, 1990 as 
scheduled, he would have received all compensation due him in due 
course. He now seeks, however, to extend his entitlement by nearly 
eight months because of his incarceration and unavailability of 
medical care, circumstances over which the Defendants had no 
control whatsoever. It is uncontroverted that all medical expenses 
and compensation have been paid except for the interim period in 
question. 
In his Order of July 9, 1991, the Administrative Law Judge 
reasoned that, "To allow the Applicant to receive temporary total 
disability while he was incarcerated, would in effect be saying 
-4-
that the Applicant, for whatever reason, may prolong the receipt of 
definitive surgical treatment, for whatever reason, and the carrier 
will be required to pay benefits during that prolonged period. 
Such a result is clearly not mandated by the Workers1 Compensation 
Act, nor by common sense or reason.11 (R. 12). 
Although not precisely in point, the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge is supported by the case of Griffith v. 
Industrial Commission, 754 P. 2d 981, in which the Utah Court of 
Appeals was confronted with a similar issue in which surgery was 
delayed due to reasons unrelated to the industrial accident. In 
the Griffith Case, the Applicant required surgery, but an internist 
evaluated his hypertension and asthma and advised that his ankle 
surgery should be postponed until the hypertension and asthma were 
controlled. The Administrative Law Judge determined that 
Defendants should not be liable for the period of time which 
Plaintifffs hypertension and asthma had to be stabilized so as to 
allow surgery to be safely performed. 
We are not here confronted with whether or not an injured 
worker can continue to receive compensation benefits for an 
industrial accident during a period of incarceration. Here, the 
issue is whether the insurance carrier can be held liable for an 
additional eight months of temporary total disability caused by a 
delay in obtaining surgery, a circumstance over which it had no 
control. In the instant case, the surgery was delayed because of 
the applicant's incarceration and because his treating physician 
was called up in the Desert Storm operation. Had the surgery taken 
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place as scheduled, there would have been no claim for additional 
compensation. Here, the delay was due to Petitioner's 
incarceration, but it could have been due to any number of reasons. 
The Petitioner could have developed anxiety about the scheduled 
surgery and refused surgery on the date scheduled. The result 
would have been the same. Surely it can not logically be argued 
that the Fund's liability can be extended by circumstances 
unrelated to the industrial accident. 
Applicant claims that he has been denied a full and fair 
hearing in this matter because no testimony was taken with respect 
to the reasons for his parole violation resulting in his 
incarceration. These reasons are wholly immaterial. A hearing 
would provide no additional probative information relative to the 
issue at hand. The original Order of the Administrative Law Judge 
was remanded by the Industrial Commission for the purpose of 
obtaining information relative to the date he was released from 
jail. In the Order Upon Remand entered by the Administrative Law 
Judge on March 20, 1992, he specifically noted the Applicant's 
incarceration was from May 22, 1990 through October 13, 1990 but he 
found no causal connection between the claimed period of disability 
and the industrial accident. Rather, he found the claimed period 
of disability was causally related to his incarceration and not to 
the industrial accident. 
In its second review of this matter, the Industrial Commission 
noted the Administrative Law Judge's statement that, "Had the 
Applicant not been incarcerated, he would have received the 
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scheduled surgery, and would not have incurred a period of 
temporary disability that he did.*1 The Commission noted that the 
Applicant had received the amount of temporary disability that he 
would have received had he not been incarcerated and there was no 
justification for extending the period for which the carrier was 
liable because of a period of incarceration or for any other reason 
over which the carrier had no control. (R. 57). 
POINT II 
The Petitioner's argument that he was punished 
due to the unavailability of medical treatment 
is without merit. 
Petitioner seeks to impute all of the circumstances leading to 
his incarceration and all of the difficulties he encountered while 
incarcerated to the Workers Compensation Fund. The Fund had 
nothing to do with the delay in the accomplishment of the 
Applicant1 s surgery. A claim that he was punished is groundless. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner's argument that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act 
does not empower the Industrial Commission to withhold workers' 
compensation benefits from incarcerated claimants misstates the 
issue in this case. By arguing that the Act is not a fault based 
system also misstates the issue in this case. The denial of the 
additional benefits claimed was not based upon Petitioner's 
incarceration or upon his fault. The denial was based upon the 
fact that the conditions and circumstances causing the delay in 
surgery were conditions and circumstances over which the Fund had 
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no control and it would be manifestly unfair to causally attribute 
such an extended period of time to the industrial accident. Fault 
is immaterial except as to the circumstances relative to the 
industrial accident itself. Fault on the part of the Petitioner 
regarding other matters is an entirely different matter. Here
€
 the 
Commission correctly concluded the Fund's liability for additional 
compensation could not be extended by the actions of others over 
whom the Fund had no control. 
WHEREFORE, Respondents move this Court for an Order denying 
the Petitioner's appeal and affirming the Order of the Industrial 
Commission. 
DATED this JL *4 day of November, 1992, 
Ridhard G. Sumsion 
Attorney for Respondents, 
Superior Roofing Company and 
Workers Compensation Fund 
of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I mailed four copies of thss foregoing Brief of 
Respondents to: 
Robert Breeze Benjamin J. Sims 
211 East Broadway #215 Industrial Coittmission of \3tah 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this pL V day of November, 1992. 
^//*lt*^™^ , .1 < , — — 
Attorney for Respondents 
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ADDENDUM 
Order dated July 9t 199 I 
Order tor Remand dated Oetobpi:: ] 7, 11 9 93 
Oiniei Upon Remand da Loci March 20, ] 992 . • • 
Denial of Motion for Review (MFR Denial, > .^ „ ^ n e Amtf ±j?& 
Section 35-1-65 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case NO. 91000307 
MARK KING, ??- % /T/~ ? & 
Appl, i rant 
ORDER 
vs. 
SUPERIOR ROOFING COMPANY and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH,' 
Defendants. 
„ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ - - - * * * * * ~ 
This case x;;verves an issue of first impression, namely, may 
a n applicant receive temporary total disability compensation while 
incarcerated. A careful review of the Utah Workers Compensation 
Act indicate that the Act is silent on this particular issue. 
Further, there is no reported Utah case law on the issue. 
The applicant herein, Mark King, sustained a compensable 
industrial accident on November 20, 1989, when he fell off a roof 
while during the course and scope of his employment. The applicant 
was paid temporary total disability benefits at the rate of $183.00 
per week commencing effective November 21, 1989 through July 13, 
1990 The applicant was scheduled for wrist surgery on May 30, 
1990. Unfortunately, on May 22, 1990, the applicant was 
incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail. The defendants 
terminated temporary total compensation benefits as of July l 3f 
1990. The applicant apparently was admitted for his surgery on 
January 29, 1991, and the surgery itself was performed on January 
30, 1991. It would appear from the fi 1 e then, that the applicant 
w as incarcerated for the period May 22, 1990 through January 28, 
1991. 
The applicant, by and through counsel, has taken the position 
that "Compensation benefits are a property right and an insurance 
benefit." By contrast, the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, by 
and through counsel, indicates that "Claimant's loss of wages 
while incarcerated was not the result of his disability, but of his 
acts resulting in his incarceration. He effectively removed 
MARK KING 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
himself from the labor market by his incarceration." Considering 
the novel nature of the question, and considering the purpose of 
the Workers Compensation Act, I conclude that the position of the 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah appears to be the more rational 
and reasonable position. The applicant, by and through his 
voluntary act of being incarcerated, should not be allowed by that 
act to postpone definitive surgical treatment indefinitely, and 
receive compensation benefits for his voluntary act which resulted 
in the delay of receiving definitive treatment. In other words, 
once definitive treatment has been recommended for an applicant, if 
the applicant because of some voluntary act, or some voluntary 
decision, decides that surgery will not be received at that time, 
then it is not fair nor reasonable to expect the workers 
compensation carrier to pay the applicant temporary total 
compensation benefits during the entire period of time that the 
applicant is either deciding to have the treatment, or has 
voluntarily made himself unavailable for the treatment. To require 
such a result, clearly abuses the nature and purpose of the workers 
compensation system. The workers compensation system is for the 
purpose of compensating lost wages, resulting from disability due 
to the industrial accident. However, in this case, the applicant's 
loss of wages for the period May 22, 1990 through January 28, 1991, 
is not directly related to the industrial accident whatsoever. 
Rather, the applicant's loss of wages for that period of time was 
solely due to his actions or conduct resulting in his being 
incarcerated for that period of time. 
Put differently, to allow the applicant to receive temporary 
total disability while he was incarcerated, would in effect be 
saying that applicants, for whatever reason, may prolong the 
receipt of definitive surgical treatment, for whatever reason, and 
the carrier will be required to pay benefits during that prolonged 
period. Such a result is clearly not mandated by the Workers 
Compensation Act, nor by common sense or reason. Therefore, for 
the period while the applicant was incarcerated, he is not entitled 
to temporary total compensation benefits. However, once the 
applicant was released from jail and presented himself for medical 
treatment on January 29, 1991, his entitlement to temporary total 
compensation benefits commenced anew. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for 
temporary total compensation benefits during the period May 22, 
1990 through January 28, 1991, should be, and the same is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
MARK KING 
ORDER 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Workers Compensation Fund shall 
be entitled to a credit for any temporary total compensation paid 
to the applicant after May 22, 1990, and before January 29, 1991, 
as against their liability for temporary total compensation for the' 
period after January 28 1991, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying In detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal, 
1M2L 
Timoti^y^CTyAllen 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed b\ the industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
,(..' -\' u 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge of June 14, 1991, is hereby remanded for further consideration. 
Stephen fl. Hadle^ 
Chairms 
" / 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
^ L 
^C "7 u \u -t 
Dixie L. Minson 
Commissioner 
Cer t i f i ed th i s /^6£J day of•J^Qptamby 1991, 
ATI EST: 
!
 Gc btr 
) 
Patricia 0. Ashby 
Commission Secretary 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 0< 
Case No. 91000307 
•••'••' "
w
" icAl 
# " 
MARK KING, , .^* ^ ^ 
Appl leant 
)RI)I«"K I ILON R E M A N D 
v s . 
SUPERIOR ROOFING and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH, 
Hi- ( endants. 
* * * * * * * * ! 
0 n juiy gr i99i# the Administrative Law Judge entered an Order 
in this matter finding that the applicant was not entitled to 
temporary total compensation for the period of his incarceration in 
what was presumed to be the Salt Lake County Jail. The 
Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant was incarcerated 
for the period May 22, 1990 through January 28, 1991• Subsequent 
to the issuance of that Order, the applicant caused an Affidavit to 
be filed with the Commission indicating that he, in fac4-. va:3 
released from the Utah State Prison on October 13, 199 0. ine 
applicant, by and through counsel, takes the position that he is 
entitled to temporary total disability benefits for the entire 
period of his incarceration of May 22, 1990 through October 
1990, and that, in, addition., the claimant is also entitled n 
temporary total compensation for the period October 14, T 
he actually received surgery on January 30, 1991. 
A s t|le reader may recall, the applicant sustained a 
compensable industrial injury on November 20, 1989, and was 
scheduled for right wrist on surgery on May 30, 1990. However, the 
applicant was returned to the Utah State Prison for a probation 
violation on May 22, 1990- The Administrative Law Judge previously 
found that the applicant's loss of wages for the claimed period was 
not related to the industrial accident whatsoever,, but, rather, was 
solely due to the actions or conduct of the applicant wnich 
resulted in his bei.iv:; incarcerated. The file was remanded to the 
Administrative Law Judge for consideration of the additional 
evidence, which " ^an only presume was the evidence that ^ he-
applicant '--.-, .: ! __•_, released from the Utah State Prison on 
October 13, :>;9- However, that additional evidence, if you will, 
does not cnange tne underlying basis for my decision. In other 
words, put differently, I also find that the applicant misreads the 
purpose of workers compensation benefits in the state of Utah. He 
also h^ c: f^ i]oHi +-- satisfy the causatio~ requirement which i s 
MARK KING 
ORDER UPON REMAND 
PAGE TWO 
mandated in every workers compensation case. Specifically/ in this 
case, the applicants industrial accident was not the ca\I5e of the 
applicant's disability for the period May 22, 1990 through October 
13, 1990, the period of incarceration. Rather, as a result of the 
applicant's incarceration. the applicant's period of disability was 
rendered greater or was permitted to continue. This period of 
disability is caused by the voluntary actions of the applicant and 
cannot fairly be attributed causally to the industrial accident. 
This same reasoning might be said to apply to the period of 
temporary total disability sought for the period October 14, 1990 
through January 29, 1991. The industrial injury did not cause this 
period of temporary disability, but, rather, this period of 
temporary disability was also causally related to the applicant's 
incarceration of May 22, 1990 through October 13, 1990. Had the 
applicant not been incarcerated, he would have received the 
scheduled surgery and would not have incurred a period of temporary 
disability that he did. Although the applicant contends that it 
was not his fault, the applicant misperceives the underlying basis 
of the workers compensation system. The workers compensation 
system is not a fault system but, rather, is a system which is 
characterized by causation, both legal and medical causation. 
Therefore, the fault or absence of fault of a party is irrelevant. 
Rather, the more probative inquiry must necessarily focus on 
whether or not there is a causal connection between the injury and 
the benefits claimed. In this case, there is no causal connection, 
because the incarceration caused the period of temporary total 
disability and caused it to be rendered greater and allowed or 
permitted it to continue far beyond its normal duration. 
To reiterate, I find there is no causal connection between the 
claimed period of disability and the industrial accident. Rather, 
I find that the applicant's claimed period of disability is 
causally related to his incarceration and not the industrial 
accident. I hereby also adopt my prior opinion in this matter and 
the same is hereby incorporated by reference as if set forth fully 
hereinabove. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for 
additional temporary total compensation is hereby, dismissed with 
prejudice. 
MARK KING 
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11 IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final arvH not. 
subject to review or appeal. 
Certified by the Industrial Commissum 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, I In 
/** 
^ - ^ ^ 
<** ~s. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH £*, v\ 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600 <t „ iA V$ 
^ 
Mark King, * %$> %> ^ 
Applicant, * DENIAL OF MOTION % \ s 
VS. * FOR REVIEW ' ^ 
Superior Roofing Co., * 
and Workers Compensation Fund * Case No. 91000307 
of Utah, * 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
<$-40W|-K*i 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for 
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
The applicant asks that we review his Motion for Review of the 
administrative law judge's (ALJ) Order Upon Remand issued March 23, 
1992. We had remanded this case to the ALJ because the applicant 
had submitted an affidavit to the Commission subsequent to the 
issuance of the ALJ's original order in this case, and the ALJ had 
not seen this affidavit. 
The applicant asserts that he is entitled to temporary total 
compensation (TTC) benefits for the entire period of his 
incarceration from May 22, 1990 through October 13, 1990, as well 
as TTC for the period October 14, 1990 until the date of surgery on 
January 30, 1991. 
The applicant had incurred an industrial injury on November 
20, 1989, and surgery was scheduled for his right wrist on May 30, 
1990. Because of a probation violation, the applicant was returned 
to the Utah State Prison on May 22, 1990. He was apparently 
released on October 13, 1990. As a result it appears that the 
applicant's surgery was rescheduled to January 30, 1991. 
The ALJ found in his Order Upon Remand that the applicant's 
industrial accident was not the cause of the disability for the 
period May 22, 1990 through October 13, 1990, the period of 
incarceration. The ALJ's order reads in pertinent part: 
...[A]s a result of the applicant's incarceration, 
the applicant's period of disability was rendered 
greater or was permitted to continue. This period 
of disability is caused by the voluntary actions 
of the applicant and cannot fairly be attributed 
causally to the industrial accident. 
Order Upon Remand, at 2. 
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The ALJ also concluded that the same logic applied to the 
period October 14, 1990 through January 29, 1991. The ALJ states, 
"Had the applicant not been incarcerated, he would have received 
the scheduled surgery, and would not have incurred a period of 
temporary disability that he did." Id. 
The applicant has received the amount of temporary total 
disability that he would have received had he not been 
incarcerated. The applicant desires his employer or insurance 
carrier to extend that period by seven months for a period of 
incarceration over which they had no control. We conclude that a 
period of incarceration under the facts of this case do not extend 
the period for which employers or insurance carriers are 
responsible. 
The applicant also complains that he has not been accorded a 
fair and full hearing. Again, we conclude that this allegation is 
without merit since there is no dispute of the facts, only the 
legal significance of them. The ALJ assumed all the material and 
relevant facts asserted by the applicant to be true. Although the 
applicant alleges that the ALJ improperly determined that his 
incarceration was due to the applicant's misconduct, we find that 
the applicant's admission in his affidavit of August 16, 1991 that 
he was in the Utah State Prison until October 13, 1990 was 
sufficient evidence on which the ALJ could conclude that the 
applicant was incarcerated. 
We can take judicial notice of the fact that people who are 
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison are there due to their 
misconduct, and that this fact is common knowledge in the 
community. Cf. Utah Fuel Co. v. Ind. Comm'n. 67 Utah 25, 245 P. 
381, 45 A.L.R. 882 (1926). Since people who are incarcerated in 
the Utah State Prison are there due to misconduct, we conclude that 
the ALJ's findings are not erroneous especially since the applicant 
has provided us no information in his Motion for Review or in his 
affidavit of August 16, 1991 which would allow us to conclude 
differently. 
For all the above reasons, the Order Upon Remand of the ALJ is 
based upon substantial evidence in light of our review of the 
entire record, and we must therefore affirm. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the Order Upon Remand of the administrative 
law judge issued on March 23, 1991 is affirmed. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a 
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes. 
Sl^p^en M. Hadley 
Chairman ^ 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Jblleen S. Coltbn 
Commissioner 
Certified this^W^Vday of f\Aj^, J 
ATTEST: 
1992. 
Patricia O. Ashby 
Commission Secx^ta^y 
t^Z§:< 
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of 
payments — State average weekly 
wage defined. 
tl) In case of temporary disability, the employee 
*hall receive 662/3% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such 
disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 
lOCFc of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four such dependent children, not to 
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury, but not to exceed 100% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a 
period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is ob-
tained prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of 
recovery, and when no such light duty employment is 
available to the employee from the employer, tempo-
rary disability benefits shall continue to be paid. 
(2) The ffstate average weekly wage" as referred to 
in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined 
by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of 
each year, the total wages reported on contribution 
reports to the department of employment security un-
der the commission for the preceding calendar year 
shall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total in-
sured workers reported for the preceding year by 
twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall 
be divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus 
determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state 
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used 
as the basis for computing the maximum compensa-
tion rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occu-
pational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 
1 determination, and any death resulting therefrom. 
